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of Litigation in the Italian Courts of Justice
Abstract: We explore the causality relationship between litigation rates and the
number of lawyers, drawing on an original panel dataset for the 169 Italian first-
instance courts of justice between 2000 and 2007. In this time period, both the
number of lawyers and the civil litigation rate sharply increased, and a mandatory
minimum fee was in place for lawyers’ services. We first document that the number
of lawyers is positively correlated with different measures of the litigation rate.
Then, using an instrumental variables strategy, we find that a 10% increase in
lawyers over population is associated with an increase between 1.6 and 6% in civil
litigation rates. Our empirical analysis supports the supplier-induced demand (SID)
hypothesis for Italian lawyers: following a sharp increase in the number of lawyers,
and in the impossibility of competing on price because of the minimum fee regula-
tion, some lawyers may have opportunistically used their informational advantage
to induce their clients to bring lawsuits into court more often than would have been
optimal if they were acting in the exclusive interest of their clients.
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Saint Ivo of Kermartin, patron saint of lawyers, a lawyer himself.)
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1 Motivation
Italy is quite rarely at the top of international rankings. In few other fields can it
exhibit as impressive a collection of records as in the international comparison
of judicial systems. Italy is the European country with the highest absolute
number of both incoming and pending civil proceedings in courts. It is also
one of the European countries with the highest number of lawyers per 100,000
inhabitants: 290, compared to the 168 of Germany, 76 of France, and 22 of
England (CEPEJ, 2008).
When looking at the data, what is most surprising is the impressive rate at
which the number of lawyers has increased in the last decades: according to the
body which runs the Italian lawyers’ social security scheme (Cassa Nazionale
Forense), lawyers have more than tripled in Italy, jumping from 42,366 in 1990 to
143,976 professionals in 2008 (þ 239.84%). In just 7 years (2000–2007) the
number of lawyers has risen from 82,637 to 136,750 professionals (þ 65.47%).
Surprisingly, this jump in the number of lawyers occurred in a period when the
national GDP was increasing at one of the lowest rates since the Second World
War (IMF, 2012). Over the same period, the litigation rate, measured by the
number of first-instance ordinary civil proceedings per 1,000 inhabitants, has
also significantly increased: incoming proceedings rose from 524.3 per 100,000
inhabitants in 1990 to 658.8 in 2007 (þ 25.7%), while pending proceedings
passed from 804.8 per 100,000 inhabitants in 1990 to as many as 1,644.7 in
2007 (þ 104.4%).1 As Figure 1 shows, the correlation between the number of
lawyers operating in each of the 169 first-instance Italian courts of justice and
the litigation rate in each province is strongly positive.2
In this work, we explicitly test the supplier-induced demand (SID) hypoth-
esis for the Italian courts of justice in the years between 2000 and 2007, a period
when more than 50,000 new lawyers entered the market. In analogy to what has
often been found for medical professionals in the health economics literature,
we hypothesize that the high number of lawyers competing for cases in a court
of justice, together with the impossibility of competing on price because of the
minimum fee regulation, could lead some lawyers to opportunistically take
advantage of their informational advantage to “induce” their clients to bring
1 It is worth noticing, as in Marchesi (2003), that the ratio between pending proceedings and
incoming proceedings passed from 363.7 in 2000 to 249.7 in 2007.
2 The correlation between the number of lawyers per 1,000 inhabitants and the litigation rate is
0.483 and it is significant at the 1% level.
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lawsuits before a court more often than would be optimal when acting in the
exclusive interest of their clients.
Using an original provincial-level dataset, we first exploit the panel struc-
ture of the data to estimate a model, which allows for both province- and time-
fixed effects, while controlling for a wide range of covariates and control vari-
ables, including the number of judges in the court, and major socio-demo-
graphic and economic characteristics of the province, such as the levels of
GDP, employment rate, education, population density, urbanization rate, and
social capital. To address the causality relation, we then employ a two-stage-
least-squared (2SLS) approach and consider two instrumental variables that are
correlated with the number of lawyers in the province, but uncorrelated with
unobserved factors that can affect litigation. The first instrument, based on the
methodology proposed by Card (1993), is the 8-year lagged average proximity of
the province to the three closest university colleges offering law courses neces-
sary to become a lawyer. The second “historical” instrument is the provincial
proximity to a law School founded in the Middle Ages.
Our main result is that the number of lawyers operating in a court does
indeed exert a positive and statistically significant effect on the litigation
Figure 1: Correlation between lawyers and total litigation rate by province (average 2000–2007)
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rate. A 10% increase in the number of lawyers over the population is associated
with a 1.6–6% increase in litigation rates. This effect is robust across
several specifications and checks, both on the control variables and on the
instruments. Our results thus support the SID hypothesis for the Italian
courts of justice for the years 2000–2007, a period of time where massive
inflows of new lawyers entered the market and a mandatory minimum fee
regulation was in place. In those years, the minimum fees for services may
have prevented lawyers from responding to tougher competition by adjusting
their prices, as would have occurred in a competitive market setting. As a
consequence, some lawyers may have reacted to the higher pressure on the
supply side by succumbing more often to the temptation of using their informa-
tional advantage in an opportunistic way, by inducing part of the demand for
legal services from their clients. This induced demand could have resulted in an
inflation of the number of lawsuits brought before the courts and thus of the
litigation rates.
Our work is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the main character-
istics of the organization of justice and the legal profession in Italy. Section 3
describes the data and the variables used in our empirical estimates. Section 4
reports the empirical strategy and the estimation results, while Section 5 pre-
sents the robustness checks. Section 6 discusses some background for the
present work, and, in particular, relates our evidence to the institutional context
in Italy and to previous findings in the literatures in law and economics and
health economics. It also contains a discussion on how the conceptual frame-
work traditionally used by the health economics literature to analyze SID can be
adjusted to account for the presence of minimum fees for services in the market.
Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 The organization of justice in Italy
2.1 Courts of justice and judges
The administration of justice in Italy is organized in three levels of courts of
justice, which can be accessed sequentially, starting from the 169 first-instance
courts of justice (Tribunali di primo grado). In many cases, these cover the same
geographic areas where the provincial administrative governments have juris-
diction. However, in several cases, especially in Piedmont and South Italy, there
is more than one court of justice for a province: some cover the most populated
cities, while others follow the old jurisdictions of the former independent states
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existing before Italian unification in 1861. In 2008, a total of 4,503 professional
judges worked in the 169 first-instance courts of justice, divided almost equally
between sections of the courts specialized in civil and penal justice (Sezioni civili
and Sezioni penali, respectively).3
It is interesting to bear in mind the evolution in the number of professional
judges in the Italian first-instance courts of justice: in the 10-year period
1998–2008, their number increased by 31.74%, increasing from 3,418 to 4,503.
However, this trend has not been monotonic. On the contrary, most of the
increase in the number of judges took place in 2000, 2002 and 2004, when
more than 5,000 magistrates were active. That number, however, declined in
the immediately following years.4 Between 2000 and 2007, the period
considered for our estimation, the number of professional judges in the
Italian first-instance courts of justice marginally declined (–3.49%) from 4,689
to 4,525.
The parties can appeal the sentence by a first-instance court of justice and
then access the second-instance courts of justice. There are 29 second instance,
or appeals, courts of justice (Corti d’Appello), usually one for each Italian region,
although the most populated regions have two. The areas over which a second-
instance court of justice has jurisdiction are called “districts” of appeal courts of
justice (Distretti di Corte d’Appello). Finally, but only for procedural or formal
matters, the parties can also appeal the sentence by the second-instance courts
of justice and then access the final degree of justice (Corte di Cassazione), which
is located only in Rome. It is important to notice that the distribution of
professional judges across the three levels of justice is greatly skewed in favor
of the first-instance courts of justice: for instance, of the 6,450 professional
judges active in 2006 in all levels of justice, as many as 4,633 worked in the
3 In the larger courts of justice, typically the ones operating in the main cities where the second
instance courts of justice are located, some of the civil justice sections focus only on legal
matters related to labor contracts (Giudici del lavoro). Administrative and tributary matters are
instead handled by specialized first instance courts of justice.
4 The reason behind this transitory increase, and then contraction, of the number of judges, is
mainly due to the selection process to appoint the judges. The selection of judges is very strict
and competitive: it requires a three-stage examination of the candidates at a national level that
needs approximately 2 years to be concluded, and usually takes place every second year,
following an official call for applications by the Ministry of Justice. Moreover, it should be
noted that, since 2004, when magistrates numbered 5,040, the total number of judges has been
constantly declining, which also reflects the fact that since then no further selection to appoint
new magistrates has taken place.
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first-instance courts (CEPEJ, 2008).5 It is also important to bear in mind that,
according to comparative statistics, Italy is among the European countries with
the lowest number of professional judges sitting in courts per 100,000 inhabi-
tants (11 in 2006, compared to a European average of 19.8).
To conclude the description of the organization of Italian courts of justice,
we should mention the existence of non-professional judges, and, in particular,
the institution in 1995 for civil matters, and in 2002 for penal matters, of the
figure of honorary judges of peace (Giudici di Pace): they are well-respected and
experienced law professionals that are temporarily appointed as honorary
judges for a (renewable) period of 4 years and serve as preliminary first-instance
courts for small claims such as controversies about houses, flats and gardens;
goods and services of a value up to an amount of 2,582.28 euro; vehicles for a
value up to 15,493.71 euro, among others.6 There are currently 3,403 honorary
judges of peace operating in Italy, distributed roughly in proportion to the
professional judges in each first-instance court of justice (CEPEJ, 2008). The
introduction of these honorary judges, aimed at diverting the simpler cases and
smaller claims from the ordinary courts of justice which are already operating
above capacity, has proved to be successful in reducing the number of files still
pending in front of the courts of justice and in contributing to a reduction in the
average time to reach a sentence.7
2.2 Cases
To test the relationship between number of lawyers and litigation rate, we will
focus on the civil cases processed by the first-instance courts of justice, including
the ones processed by honorary judges of peace. The choice to focus only on
litigation in civil courts is mainly motivated by the crucial difference between civil
and penal cases in the Italian justice: while a civil case may be started by any
5 Notice that this figure does not include the 2,231 (in 2006: CEPEJ, 2008) professional public
prosecutors (Procuratori della Repubblica) operating in the separate and independent sections
(Procure) within the first instance courts of justice.
6 Access to these honorary judges is much quicker, easier and cheaper for the parties than the
access to the ordinary first instance courts of justice; usually controversies are reconciled by
proposing a compromise solution for the parties and sentences are rarely appealed to the
ordinary courts of justice.
7 Nevertheless, official comparative statistics show that Italy is still among the European
countries with the lowest number of both non-professional judge per professional judge (1.1 in
2006, the fourth lowest figure) and non-professional judges per 100.000 inhabitants (12 in 2006,
the third lowest figure: CEPEJ, 2008).
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citizen, assisted by a lawyer, and is therefore a natural candidate to test whether
litigation may be partly caused by “inducement” by lawyers, a penal case must be
started by a public prosecutor, thus leaving no room for inducement by lawyers.
The natural starting point is a comparative perspective within the European
countries. As already mentioned, official statistics from CEPEJ (2008) gives Italy
a number of international records. Considering 2006 statistics, for instance, Italy
is the European country with the highest absolute number of incoming litigious
civil cases into first-instance courts: 2,825,453, compared to 1,104,828 cases in
Germany and 1,688,367 in France (CEPEJ, 2008). Such a massive inflow of
incoming cases, rather than being an exception, is in line with the trend in the
last 15 years, and clearly contributes to keeping the total number of pending civil
litigation cases at 3,687,965 (at the end of 2006), again the highest absolute
figure in Europe (CEPEJ, 2008). Even when such statistics are read in relative
terms, the record of Italy remains largely unchallenged: taking 2006 data, Italy
is the European country with the second highest number (after the Netherlands)
of first-instance incoming litigious civil cases per 100,000 inhabitants (4,809,
compared to 2,672 in France and 1,342 in Germany: CEPEJ, 2008).
2.3 Lawyers
The organization of lawyers in Italy closely follows the organization of the courts
of justice. Lawyers must be enrolled in an official compulsory register (Albo
professionale degli avvocati) that is held and supervised by a local professional
bar association (Ordine degli avvocati), to which the national law gives extensive
legal prerogatives. There are 169 local professional associations, one for every
first-instance court of justice. Bar associations are formed by all lawyers enrolled
in the official register, who elect a council and a chairman (Consiglio dell’Ordine,
Presidente dell’Ordine). The latter are legally in charge of the supervision of the
official register and, more generally, of the professional conduct of the associ-
ates. They also decide on all controversies among lawyers, and between lawyers
and their clients, and, in order to enforce their supervision of the professional
conduct of the associates, have some disciplinary powers, such as suspension or
expulsion from the official register.
The national law also regulates the criteria needed for lawyers to be eligible
to enroll into official registers. In fact, access to the legal profession in Italy
requires a first degree in law (5 years), followed by a 2-year apprenticeship in a
legal practice (Praticantato). In order to obtain the official qualification as
lawyer, successful candidates have then to pass a two-stage selection process,
which takes approximately 1 year to conclude.
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Besides the local professional associations, a national Italian Bar Association
(Consiglio Nazionale Forense) operates at the Ministry of Justice in Rome to decide
on controversies between local associations. The main prerogative of the national
council of lawyers, however, is to set, every second year, all the payment tariffs
and fees for service to be paid to lawyers, for civil, penal, administrative and
tributary cases. Such decisions by the national council are subject to formal
approval by the Ministry of Justice and are then legally binding for all lawyers
and uniform across every local register.
In particular, the payment scheme set by the national council shows some
important features. First, unlike in other systems, contingent fees are not
allowed: payment is always due and the client must pay the amount to the
lawyer regardless of the outcome of the controversy. Second, the overall pay-
ment to the lawyer is directly proportional to the amount of legal services and
acts provided by the lawyer.8
Moreover, even though it is possible to agree on a premium payment to the
lawyer in case of a positive outcome, payments proportional to the value of the
controversy are also explicitly ruled out. Finally, and importantly, the payment
scheme as set by the national council is legally binding. In particular, no
payment can be charged below the level set by the national council of lawyers,
which thus serves as a compulsory minimum fee.9 Lawyers, however, are free, to
a large extent, to ask for payments higher than the amounts set by the Italian
Bar Association.
Data on the number of lawyers are available from two different sources. On
the one hand, the Italian Bar Association does not provide yearly data on the
number of lawyers enrolled in each local register being these statistics only
available every 2–3 years. The main reason why this first source of data is
scarcely reliable for an empirical investigation lies not in their incomplete
availability, though. In fact, in Italy whoever has obtained the professional
qualification as a lawyer has the right to remain in the official register regardless
of whether they are actually working as lawyer. The local registers thus include
8 In particular, the Ministry of Justice decree 127/2004 specifies that the payment to the lawyers
(parcella) consists, in addition to the reimbursement of all expenses, of two parts: the tariffs
(onorari) and the fees for services (diritti).
9 As it will be discussed in greater detail in Section 6, the existence of such minimum
compulsory fees for legal services has been challenged by the decree 223/2006 (the so-called
Bersani decree) aimed at their elimination. Although the national council of lawyers opposed
the decree and tried to limit its applicability, the decree came into effect from 2008. This
explains the 2000–2007 time period considered for our empirical estimation. See Section 6 for
a discussion of the most recent reforms in Italy.
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many professionals who actually work only occasionally or have abandoned the
profession for different career paths.10
On the other hand, on request, the Italian Lawyers’ Social Security office
(Cassa Nazionale Forense) kindly provides official statistics on the number of
lawyers in each local register who are also enrolled in the social security
scheme, and we have been able to obtain these data for each year between
1992 and 2008.
As the two sources of data differ, there is a discrepancy between the number
of lawyers registered to the Italian Bar Association registers (Albo Avvocati) and
the number of those enrolled in the Lawyers’ Social Security scheme (Cassa
Nazionale Forense). In particular, the latter underestimates the official number of
lawyers.11 As empirical estimates are concerned, issues may arise only if the
difference between the two measures would change over time within provinces.
Data available show that the ratio between the two measures is approximately
constant across time within provinces. Therefore, controlling for both province-
and time-fixed effects allows our analysis to adequately deal with the potential
measurement error.12
Data show that in less than 20 years, the number of lawyers enrolled in the
national pension scheme more than tripled, jumping from 42,366 professionals
in 1990 to 143,976 in 2008 (þ 239.84%). The total number of lawyers doubled
during the 1990s and, between 2000 and 2007 (the period considered for our
estimation), experienced an equally impressive increase (þ 65.48%) from 82,637
to 136,750 professionals, corresponding to the entry of more than 50,000 new
professionals.
Finally, European statistics show that in 2006 Italy was not only the
European country with the highest number of lawyers but also with the highest
10 The seriousness of this issue is confirmed by the recent, fiercely debated, intention on the
part of the national council of lawyers to exclude from the local registers any professional who
is not earning from the lawyers’ activity a minimum level of income as a lawyer. The statistics
published in the official publication by Cassa Nazionale Forense (Biancofiore, 2009; Donella,
2009) show that 47.605 lawyers enrolled in the official registers declared in 2008 no income
from the legal profession.
11 In 2008, 53,969 lawyers were enrolled into the official registers but not in the national
pension scheme. The discrepancy between the two measures appears to be especially large in
southern Italian provinces. Many possible explanations can be put forward. Since enrollment
into the pension scheme is compulsory only from a minimum threshold of earned income, it
may be more difficult for lawyers in southern Italian regions to earn a sufficiently high income.
Tax evasion may be an alternative explanation.
12 For a detailed analysis of the discrepancy between these two sources, see Donella (2009).
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number of lawyers per professional judge (26.4, compared to 7.1 of France, 6.9 of
Germany and 3.2 of the United Kingdom), as well as with the second highest
number of lawyers per 100,000 inhabitants (only second to Greece, with 342):
290, compared to 168 of Germany, 76 of France and 22 of United Kingdom
(CEPEJ, 2008).
3 Data description and panel analysis
Data regarding civil proceedings and lawyers have been collected at the level of
courts of justice and then aggregated at the level of the 103 Italian provinces.13
Our balanced panel dataset comprises annual observations for the 103 provinces
over the period from 2000 to 2007.14
Civil litigation data come from the civil justice statistics recorded by the
courts of justice. These statistics are published yearly by the Italian Statistical
Institute (ISTAT) and allow a disaggregation by province and type of litigation.
In particular, we distinguish among different forms of litigation: first-instance
ordinary civil proceedings before civil courts of justice (courts of justice); first-
instance ordinary civil proceedings before honorary judges of peace (judges of
peace); total litigation rate, given by the sum of the previous two (total litigation
rate); and litigation for civil compensation claim (compensation).15
The main explanatory variable is the number of lawyers over population at
the provincial level (lawyers). As discussed above, we use the total number of
lawyers enrolled in the pension scheme, divided by local professional register,
as obtained by Cassa Nazionale Forense, the agency managing the lawyers’
social security. In order to control for the lawyers–judges ratio and for a proxy
of productivity in each court, we add as an explanatory variable the number of
judges over population at the provincial level in each year (judges).
13 The 103 Italian provinces (i.e. administrative Italian counties) correspond to the NUTS 3
Eurostat classification areas and are comparable in size to US counties, while the 20 Italian
regions correspond to the NUTS 2 Eurostat classification.
14 As already discussed above, the choice of the period considered for our empirical estimation
is motivated by the fact that, from 2008 on, the minimum fees set by the national council of
lawyers have no longer been considered mandatory, in light of the above discussed Bersani
decree 223/2006. See Section 6 for a more detailed discussion on the recent reforms of the
judicial system in Italy.
15 According to the Italian Civil Code, civil compensation claims are considered to be a
subcategory of total litigation.
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Our dataset also includes a set of socioeconomic and demographic variables
that are likely to be correlated with litigation rates. Demographic variables
include the population density in the province (density), and the concentration
index (concentration), calculated as the ratio between the population living in
the provincial administrative city over the population in the rest of the provincial
area. We include these variables since in more densely populated areas the
number of social interactions and, thus, the potential for conflicts and disputes
is greater. Turning to the socioeconomic variables, we include the (log of) real
GDP per capita (GDP per capita), and the employment rate (employment),
which measure the size and development of a provincial economy, both of
which have been proved to be potentially correlated to the litigation rate
(Posner, 1997; Hanssen, 1999; Clemenz and Gugler, 2000; Ginsburg and
Hoetker, 2006).
It may be argued that the level of education of the population may also
affect the level of civil litigation, although the direction of such an effect seems
more ambiguous. In fact, on the one hand, a better educated population may
also be more aware of their rights and, possibly, more inclined to pursue their
rights by bringing lawsuits before a court. On the other hand, a better educated
population may also be more aware of alternative methods of dispute resolution,
or more informed about the high costs and long time horizons necessary to
conclude a dispute in court, and therefore, more discouraged from accessing
courts of justice. In order to check the effect and, if any, the direction of
education on litigation, we include the percentage of population with a high
school diploma as a proxy for education (high school).
Finally, the level of civil litigation may be affected by the level of social
capital in the province. For instance, a higher level of social capital may reduce
civil litigation since individuals are more respectful of contracts and laws and
because they may also favor an informal resolution of civil disputes. Following
Buonanno et al. (2009) we include, as a measure of social capital, the density of
associations (associations), namely the number of recreational, cultural, artistic
and sporting non-profit associations, per 100,000 inhabitants at provincial level
in each year.
Our list of control variables is likely to be incomplete, since it is impossible
to control for all factors affecting civil litigation. Thus, to control for unobserved
factors, we exploit the panel structure of our dataset and we include both
province- and year-fixed effects.
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1, while Table 2 reports the
correlation matrix among all dependent and explanatory variables. As already
mentioned, the correlation between lawyers and civil litigation is positive for all
types of civil litigation considered.
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Our main estimating equation is
litigationit ¼ β lawyersit þ γ0 Xit þ ’i þ ’t þ εit ½1
where litigationit is the log of the civil litigation rates recorded by the civil courts
in province i during year t; lawyerit is the number of lawyers over population; Xit
is a set of control variables; fi and ft are province- and year-fixed effects and
finally εit is an error term.
The set of observables Xit comprises the other demographic and socioeco-
nomic determinants of civil litigation discussed above.
OLS estimates on eq. [1] are presented in Table 3 and suggest that the
different measures of litigiosity are significantly correlated with the incidence
of lawyers in the population. This relationship is overall robust across the
different definitions of litigation rates and even across alternative specifications
of determinants and controls of civil litigation. According to these findings, a
10% increase in the number of lawyers over population is associated with a 3%
increase of total litigation rate, a 1.6% increase of litigation rate in civil courts of
justice, a 4% increase of litigation rate before honorary judges of peace and a 5%
increase in litigation related to compensation.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Total litigation 824 2.418 0.450 1.464 4.200
Civil courts 824 1.816 0.306 0.955 2.734
Judges of peace 824 1.510 0.705 −0.149 4.078
Compensation 824 0.597 0.889 –1.215 3.664
Lawyers 824 1.656 0.697 0.126 6.995
Judges 824 0.075 0.0264 0.024 0.178
Length 962.73 310.063 205 2,499
Accountants 824 0.616 0.229 0.005 1.874
Density 824 246.027 331.301 22.954 2,640.92
Concentration 824 47.376 74.562 9.593 680.92
GDP 824 18,121.36 4,559.8 9,829.364 30,370.54
Employment 824 44.751 6.774 28.184 58.662
High school 824 0.338 0.039 0.257 0.485
Associations 824 33.727 16.340 7.75 104.73
Note: This table reports the descriptive statistics for all dependent and explanatory variables
across the 103 Italian provinces during the period 2000–2007.
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Turning to the control variables, it emerges that GDP, employment rate and
the number of judges in the court do not exert a significant effect on local
litigation rates. Our measure for education is negatively correlated to litigation
rates, even if not always significant. Population density is negatively and sig-
nificantly correlated with our dependent variables, while the concentration
index exerts a positive and significant effect on litigation rates. Finally the
level of social capital does not present consistent patterns and is sensitive to
the type of litigation rate considered.
However, there could be several reasons why the number of lawyers over
population is systematically correlated with litigiosity, some of which may not
be adequately captured by our control variables. Therefore, identifying causality
requires a source of exogenous variation in the number of lawyers, an issue that
we tackle in the next section.
4 Causality
Even after controlling for other determinants of litigation and for time- and
province-fixed effects, the number of lawyers across provinces could be corre-
lated with the error term for several reasons. In particular, a typical argument
that can be put forward is one based upon a reverse direction of causality. When
choosing a location for their office, in fact, young lawyers may try to assess the
areas where demand will be high enough to guarantee a sufficient level of
expected revenue. Areas and cities with high demand for legal services should
thus attract more lawyers than those with low demand. Consequently, a high per
capita utilization of legal services leads to a high density of lawyers and not
vice-versa.16
4.1 IV strategy
In order to address the endogeneity issue, we need some variable that is a good
measure of the number of lawyers in a court but is exogenous to changes in the
local litigation rates. To this purpose, following the methodology originally
proposed by Card (1993), we use the 8-year lagged average proximity (proximity)
of the province to the three closest universities offering a degree allowing one to
16 In order to provide further evidence that this is really unlikely to be the case, one could take
a look at the data on how many lawyers “move” across cities. Data on lawyers’ mobility,
however, do not exist for Italy.
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obtain a qualification as a lawyer, as this could clearly be related to the
individual choice of subject at university. The reason why we use lagged values
for the average proximity is related to the fact that, as discussed above, access to
the legal profession in Italy requires a 5-year first degree in law, followed by a
2-year apprenticeship in a legal practice, and a successful exam for professional
qualification, held once a year in each second-instance district of justice. Notice
that in Italy, besides the Schools of Law, also the Schools of Economics and
Political Sciences can offer university degrees which allow students to then
pursue a career as a lawyer.
The Italian university system has two peculiar features in favor of our
instrument: (i) there is very low mobility of students across cities and univer-
sities;17 (ii) since Italian universities, except for rare exceptions, are public, and
generally charge fees significantly lower than in other European countries, the
most relevant expenses for university students are living and travel costs. For
this reason, the proximity of a law school may influence the choice of the
university subject by Italian students.
More specifically, we consider the distance of the centroid of each province
from the three closest universities offering a degree in law. It is worth stressing
that over the 1990s, due to the implementation of several and subsequent
reforms of the university system, the number of universities and faculties has
significantly increased. Thus, the distance of the province from the three closest
law schools exhibits variance over time.
Formally, our instrument is
IVit ¼ 11
3
P
j dijðt8Þ
½2
where dijt are the three distances with the closest law courses that will allow
graduates to undertake the exam to become lawyers. In particular, to account for
the lengthy training process described above, we consider the localization of law
courses and law schools 8 years before any corresponding data for the number
of lawyers and litigation rates. It is worthwhile to emphasize that our instrument
is time variant for two reasons. During the considered period: (a) new Law
Schools may have opened and (b) Schools of Economics or Political Sciences
may have started offering courses in Law.
Once equipped with these instruments for lawyers, we proceed to analyze
the effects on civil litigation rates. Table 4 shows the results of our IV estimation
17 Makovec (2005) and Brunello and Cappellari (2008) document that three-quarters of the
university students in Italy attend a university degree program in the same city where their
parents live.
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Table 4: 2SLS Regressions
Panel A: First stage
Proximity 0.3977***
(0.0866)
F-test 21.07
Panel B: Second stage
Total litigation rate Civil courts Judges of peace Compensation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lawyers 0.3436** 0.5922*** 0.5199** 0.4185**
(0.1723) (0.1717) (0.2492) (0.2036)
Judges −0.3028 −0.4081 −0.1358 0.8477
(0.8688) (0.6651) (1.1656) (0.7775)
High school –1.9028** –2.1132** –1.7674 −0.8482
(0.7748) (0.8675) (1.0794) (0.9378)
Associations 0.0052*** 0.0052*** 0.0036 −0.0019
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0025) (0.0025)
GDP per capita 0.00002** 8.00e-06 0.00004*** 1.00e-05
(1.00e-05) (1.00e-05) (1.00e-05) (1.00e-05)
Employment 0.0077* 0.0037 0.0061 0.0070
(0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0055) (0.0051)
Density −0.0029*** −0.0005 −0.0049*** −0.0052***
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0010)
Concentration 0.0130*** 0.0085*** 0.0212*** 0.0216***
(0.0034) (0.0030) (0.0043) (0.0063)
Obs. 824 824 824 824
Provinces 103 103 103 103
Prov. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The top panel of this table presents first-stage estimates of IV regressions. The bottom
panel reports the results of 2SLS (second-stage) estimates on a panel of yearly observations for
all 103 Italian provinces during the period 2000–2007. The dependent variable is the log of the
civil litigation rate recorded by the civil courts of justice, for each category of civil litigation. All
control variables in Table 3 are always included, both in the first and in the second stage. The
sources of data for lawyers and civil litigation are Cassa Nazionale Forense (Lawyer Pension
Agency) and ISTAT, respectively. The F-statistic refers to the null hypothesis that the coefficients
on the excluded instruments are jointly equal to zero in the first stage. Robust standard errors
are presented in parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis of the
coefficient being equal to 0 at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively.
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that include province- and year-fixed effects. The first-stage regression confirms
that our instrument fits well. Proximity is strongly significant and with the
expected sign. IV diagnostic shows the relevance of the instruments. The F-
statistics of the regression is equal to 21.07, which is well above the lower
bounds indicated by the literature on weak instruments (see Bound and
Holzer, 2000 and Stock and Yogo, 2002).
Overall, 2SLS estimates are qualitatively and quantitatively consistent with
the OLS results. In particular, according to our IV estimates, a 10% increase in
the number of lawyers over population is associated with a 3% increase of total
litigation rate, a 6% increase of litigation rate in civil courts of justice, a 5%
increase of litigation rate before honorary judges of peace and a 4% increase in
litigation related to compensation. Despite the expectation to observe an upward
bias in our OLS estimates, we find a downward bias, which is clear evidence of
attenuation bias due to classical measurement error. Nevertheless, the 2SLS
estimates are less precise than OLS ones as confirmed by larger standard errors.
Thus, the 2SLS coefficients for total litigation rate, judges of peace and compen-
sation are not statistically different from the OLS ones.
Overall, our results suggest that there is a causal effect of the number of
lawyers on the civil litigation rates.
4.2 Historical IV strategy
One possible concern about the proximity instrument could be related to the fact
that the presence of law schools is not exogenous to the litigation rate that has
historically prevailed in a province. In other words, it is possible that new law
faculties are established in those provinces with the highest level of litigation
rate. In order to deal with this potential problem, we also implemented an
historical IV strategy. In particular, we consider the presence of a law faculty
in a province in the Middle Ages and we build two measures: a variable
capturing the province’s proximity to a medieval law school and a dummy
variable for the presence of a law school in a province at the end of the sixteenth
century. It is worth noticing that 22 law faculties were present in Italy at the end
of the sixteenth century.18
18 University foundation years (chronological order): Bologna 1088, Padua 1222, Naples 1224,
Siena 1240, Macerata 1290, Parma 1200-1300, Rome 1303, Genova 1307, Perugia 1308, Florence
1321, Camerino 1321 (newly founded in 1727), Verona 1339 (newly founded in 1987), Pisa 1343,
Pavia 1361, Ferrara 1391, Turin 1404, Catania 1444, Messina 1548, Urbino 1564, Bari 1581 (newly
founded in 1925), L’Aquila 1596, Modena 1598.
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One important econometric issue is related to the time invariance of law
school in the Middle Ages. This forces us to rely on an RE panel model, although
still allowing for regional FE. Tables 5 and 6 show the results of our historical IV
estimation that include region- and year-fixed effects. The first-stage regression
confirms that both our instruments fit well. Proximity to a medieval law school
and the dummy for the presence of a law school in a province at the end of the
sixteenth century are strongly significant and with the expected sign. IV diag-
nostic shows the relevance of our instruments. The F-statistics are respectively
equal to 24.66 and 27.12. Overall, historical IV estimates are qualitatively and
quantitatively consistent with the OLS results and the previous 2SLS estimates.
Table 5: Historical IV strategy – law faculty proximity
Panel A: First stage
Middle ages proximity 0.7377***
(0.1314)
F-test 28.17
Panel B: Second stage
Total litigation rate Civil courts Judges of peace Compensation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lawyers 0.3589*** 0.2888*** 0.3453 0.7590**
(0.1314) (0.0988) (0.2218) (0.3769)
Obs. 824 824 824 824
Provinces 103 103 103 103
Regional FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The top panel of this table presents first-stage estimates of IV regressions. The bottom
panel reports the results of 2SLS (second-stage) estimates on a panel of yearly observations for
all 103 Italian provinces during the period 2000–2007. The dependent variable is the log of the
civil litigation rate recorded by the civil courts of justice, for each category of civil litigation. All
control variables in Table 3 are always included, both in the first and in the second stage. The
sources of data for lawyers and civil litigation are Cassa Nazionale Forense (Lawyer Pension
Agency) and ISTAT, respectively. The F-statistic refers to the null hypothesis that the coefficients
on the excluded instruments are jointly equal to zero in the first stage. The Hansen J-test is a
test of overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument
validity. Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote rejection
of the null hypothesis of the coefficient being equal to 0 at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level,
respectively.
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5 Robustness checks
In this section, we perform several alternative specifications designed to test the
robustness of our estimates.
A first possible objection may be related to the concern that our estimates may
be measuring some spurious effects that are not attributable to the lawyers
themselves, but to a systematic change in the economic structure of professions
in Italy. In particular, as already discussed in the introduction, professional
accountants and business consultants have also experienced a significant increase
over the last 15 years. Thus, in order to support or reject such an objection, we
re-run our regressions by using the number of professional accountants and
Table 6: Historical IV strategy – law faculty dummy
Panel A: First stage
Middle ages dummy 0.2894***
(0.0556)
F-test 27.12
Panel B: Second stage
Total litigation rate Civil courts Judges of peace Compensation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lawyers 0.3305** 0.2749*** 0.3139 0.7372**
(0.1322) (0.0998) (0.2259) (0.3612)
Obs. 824 824 824 824
Provinces 103 103 103 103
Regional FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The top panel of this table presents first-stage estimates of IV regressions. The bottom
panel reports the results of 2SLS (second-stage) estimates on a panel of yearly observations for
all 103 Italian provinces during the period 2000–2007. The dependent variable is the log of the
civil litigation rate recorded by the civil courts of justice, for each category of civil litigation. All
control variables in Table 3 are always included, both in the first and in the second stage. The
sources of data for lawyers and civil litigation are Cassa Nazionale Forense (Lawyer Pension
Agency) and ISTAT, respectively. The F-statistic refers to the null hypothesis that the coefficients
on the excluded instruments are jointly equal to zero in the first stage. The Hansen J-test is a
test of overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument
validity. Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote rejection
of the null hypothesis of the coefficient being equal to 0 at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level,
respectively.
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business consultants, rather than lawyers. The obtained results from such a
regression, presented in Table 7, show that the effect of the number of profes-
sional accountants and business consultants on civil litigation is not statistically
different from zero, thus providing no ground for the above objection.
Another possible objection could be related to the specific type of variables for
the litigation rates used in our estimates. In particular, our empirical analysis
focuses on litigation as reflected in civil courts, and therefore completely
Table 7: Robustness check: professional accountants
Total litigation rate Civil courts Judges of peace Compensation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Accountants 0.1807 −0.0512 0.3843 0.2770
(0.2130) (0.2553) (0.2730) (0.3761)
Judges −0.2142 −0.0860 −0.1013 0.8997
(0.9958) (0.7016) (1.2702) (0.8982)
High school –2.2325** –2.7624*** –2.3822* –1.3471
(1.0226) (0.8898) (1.4345) (1.3787)
Associations 0.0041** 0.0026 0.0021 −0.0031
(0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0028) (0.0036)
GDP per capita 0.00002 9.00e-06 0.00004* 0.00002
(0.00002) (1.00e-05) (0.00002) (0.00002)
Employment 0.0091* 0.0065 0.0084 0.0086
(0.0053) (0.0044) (0.0075) (0.0079)
Density −00034* −0.0014 −0.0057** −0.0058***
(0.0018) (0.0014) (0.0026) (0.0022)
Concentration 0.0123* 0.0066 0.0194* 0.0203
(0.0069) (0.0049) (0.0104) (0.0141)
Obs. 824 824 824 824
Provinces 103 103 103 103
Prov. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents the results of OLS estimates on a panel of yearly observations for all
103 Italian provinces during the period 2000–2007. The dependent variable is the log of the
civil litigation rate recorded by the civil courts of justice, for each category of civil litigation. The
variable Accountants is the number of professional accountants over province population. The
sources of data for accountants and civil litigation are CNPADC (Professional Accountants
Pension Agency) and ISTAT, respectively. Province- and year-fixed effects are included in all
specifications. Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote
rejection of the null hypothesis of the coefficient being equal to 0 at 10%, 5% and 1%
significance level, respectively.
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disregards the number of proceedings pending in front of penal courts.
Concerning this point, there is a crucial difference between civil and penal
cases in Italy. In fact, while a civil case may be started by any citizen, assisted
by a lawyer, and is therefore a natural candidate to test whether a lawyer may
play a role in inducing part of the demand, a penal case has to be started by a
public prosecutor, thus leaving no room for inducement by lawyers. Therefore, if
we consider some measures of litigation in penal courts, we expect to see no
effects exerted by the number of lawyers. In our robustness check, we consider,
for instance, three types of very common property crimes (thefts, car thefts and
bag snatches) and murders. Our estimates, presented in Table 8, show that the
Table 8: Robustness check: crime rates
Theft Car theft Bag snatch Murder
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lawyers 0.0654 0.1092 0.0619 –0.0701
(0.0410) (0.0936) (0.1156) (0.1561)
Judges 0.1488 1.8552** 0.3145 0.3577
(0.4863) (0.8819) (1.0840) (2.1031)
High school 1.5625* 0.1736 –0.2640 4.1036*
(0.9415) (2.1689) (2.0220) (2.4933)
Associations 0.0002 0.0007 –0.0015 –0.0018
(0.0019) (0.0038) (0.0042) (0.0067)
GDP per capita 8.81e-08 0.00003 –6.00e-06 –1.00e-05
(1.00e-05) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00004)
Employment 0.0030 0.0055 0.0045 0.0072
(0.0035) (0.0110) (0.0106) (0.0162)
Density 0.0015* 0.0023 –0.0073** 0.0023
(0.0008) (0.0014) (0.0032) (0.0020)
Concentration 0.0061* 0.0105* 0.0204*** 0.0067
(0.0034) (0.0057) (0.0055) (0.0092)
Obs. 824 824 824 824
Provinces 103 103 103 103
Prov. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents the results of OLS estimates on a panel of yearly observations for all
103 Italian provinces during the period 2000–2007. The dependent variable is the log of crimes
reported by the police over the total population, for each category of criminal offense. The
variable Lawyers is the number of lawyers over province population. The sources of data for
lawyers and crime rates are Cassa Nazionale Forense (Lawyer Pension Agency) and ISTAT,
respectively. Province- and year-fixed effects are included in all specifications. Robust standard
errors are presented in parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis of the
coefficient being equal to 0 at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively.
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number of lawyers in the court indeed does not exert any significant effect on
the number of penal files, thus giving further support to our results.
Finally, we add to our main specification the lagged length of first-instance
trials as a control, in order to test whether the expected length of the trial may
affect the individual’s decision to access civil court. Our estimates, presented in
Table 9, confirm the main results discussed above and show that the length of
first-instance trials is negatively correlated to litigation rates.
Table 9: Robustness check: first-instance proceedings length
Total litigation rate Civil courts Judges of peace Compensation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lawyers 0.2659*** 0.2131*** 0.3201*** 0.4610***
(0.0847) (0.0776) (0.1094) (0.1382)
Judges 0.2893 0.1015 0.6242 2.0735**
(0.9360) (0.6202) (1.2203) (0.9764)
Length–1 −0.0001*** −0.0001*** −0.0001* −0.00008
(0.00004) (0.00005) (0.00007) (0.00009)
High school –1.1699 –2.0785** –1.1614 −0.9974
(0.9825) (0.8233) (1.4890) (1.3574)
Associations 0.0054*** 0.0030* 0.0046 −0.0006
(0.0020) (0.0016) (0.0029) (0.0031)
GDP 0.00004** 0.00002 0.00005* 0.00003
(0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00003)
Employment rate 0.0064 0.0045 0.0055 0.0060
(0.0051) (0.0043) (0.0076) (0.0074)
Density −0.0027** −0.0014 −0.0044** −0.0051***
(0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0020) (0.0018)
Concentration 0.0093** 0.0053* 0.0163** 0.0230**
(0.0043) (0.0028) (0.0079) (0.0098)
Obs. 721 721 721 721
Provinces 103 103 103 103
Prov. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents the results of OLS estimates on a panel of yearly observations for all
103 Italian provinces during the period 2001–2007. The dependent variable is the log of civil
litigation rate recorded by the civil courts of justice, for each category of civil litigation. The
variable lawyer is the number of lawyers over province population. The sources of data for
lawyers and crime rates are Cassaforense (Lawyer Pension Agency) and ISTAT, respectively. All
other variables are defined in the Appendix. Province- and year-fixed effects are included in all
specifications. Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote
rejection of the null hypothesis of the coefficient being equal to 0 at 10%, 5% and 1%
significance level, respectively.
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6 Discussion and background of the results
In the previous sections, we have shown that an increase in the relative number of
lawyers operating in a court of justice exerts a positive and significant effect on the
litigation rate in that court, providing support for the SID hypothesis. In this
background section, we first discuss in greater detail the institutional aspects of
the market for legal services in Italy that could have favored such opportunistic
behavior by lawyers. We then relate our results to the empirical law and economics
literature, which has studied the judicial system in Italy, and to previous studies,
which have found evidence of SID in other countries. We also relate our findings to
the much wider literature in health economics that has documented SID in the
market for healthcare services. Inspired by this literature, we finally propose a
simple graphical framework, which extends the conceptual model typically used in
health economics in order to account for the presence of mandatory minimum
fees, such as the ones in force in the Italian market for legal services.
6.1 The institutional aspects of the Italian market for
legal services
The mere fact that the consumption of legal services, and therefore the litigation
rate, increases with the number of lawyers, is consistent with several explana-
tions. For instance, if the market for lawyers were competitive, then an increase
in the number of lawyers should lead to an outward shift of the market supply
function. Combined with a downward-sloping demand curve, this predicts an
increase in the number of traded legal services, paired with a fall in their fees.
The effect on total expenditure in legal services is ambiguous and depends on
the price elasticity of demand. Under this perspective, the higher litigation rate
is simply the demand reaction to lower fees consequent to an increase in the
supply and is therefore nothing but a market adjustment.
The argument based upon this market explanation, however, cannot apply to
the case of Italian lawyers. In fact, the Italian institutional context has greatly
favored a substantial rigidity of lawyers’ fees. The main cause for lawyers’ fees
failing to decline is related to the above discussed legal privilege of the national
council of lawyers to set a minimum fee for legal services, which is mandatory and
uniform across all Italian courts of justice.19 The existence of such minimum fees
19 A similar relation has been observed in the health economics literature between an
increased supply of physicians and an increase in utilization of health care services, in spite
of non-declining prices for medical services: Fuchs (1978) observes it in the United States even
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may represent not only a lower bound for the attempts to decrease prices but also
serves as a salient reference price for lawyers when setting their fees, thus curbing
price competition, as also pointed out by the Italian antitrust authority on several
occasions (Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, 1997, 2009).
The existence of such an implicit “floor” to price competition for lawyers’
services has in fact motivated the reform by the last Prodi Government, through
the above-mentioned so-called Bersani Decree 223/2006, that eliminated the
minimum fees, starting from 2008. The intention to re-introduce the privilege
to set minimum fees was then clearly set out by the last Berlusconi Government
(Decree 59/2010).20
Interestingly, one of the first reforms by Monti’s coalition Government in power
from November 2011 to April 2013 aimed at fostering competition in the internal
market has focused on removing several anti-competitive barriers and restrictions.
Among these, one of the most heatedly debated reforms was indeed the elimination
of the privilege of the Italian Bar Association to set lawyers’ minimum fees.
As we will argue below, the joint presence of a mandatory minimum fee, set by
the national council of lawyers, and of a large share of new entrants in the market
who are likely to provide legal services at the minimum fees (more than 50,000 new
lawyers entered the market in the 2000–2007 period) are conditions that make the
above market explanation hard to believe for the case of Italian lawyers.
An alternative explanation to physiological market adjustment can in fact be
found in the peculiarities of the lawyer–client relationship. One of the key ingre-
dients of this relationship is the clients’ incomplete information about their true
needs. Typically, clients who consult a lawyer only know that they require some
legal assistance, because, for instance, they are not satisfied with some contrac-
tual obligation or extra-contractual relation. Rather like what happens in a doctor–
patient relationship, the client tends to trust the better-informed lawyer to delegate
in the presence of higher fees; Adam (1983), Breyer (1984) and Breyer et al. (1986) detect it in
some German Lander where fees were fixed at a uniform rate across regions and Grytten et al.
(1990) observe it for the demand for dental services in Norway, where a national fixed price was
in place.
20 This possibly occurred also because of the likely occurrence of lobbying pressures from the
National Bar Associations, and from the many lawyers serving as MPs in the House of
Parliament. According to Merlo et al. (2010), in fact, although the fraction of MPs coming
from the legal services has steadily declined since the Second World War, 10.6% of the MPs
are still professionals from the legal sector. In some parties, mostly right-wing leaning, lawyers
represent more than one-fifth of the MPs. Moreover, among all MPs, lawyers are the most likely
to then go back to their legal profession once the parliamentary mandate is completed (53.51%,
Merlo et al. (2010)), which signals that they could have quite a strong interest in backing
legislative initiatives that defend and restore the prerogatives and privileges of their profession.
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to the latter the choice of the exact legal and juridical instruments, and, more
often than not, to follow the lawyer’s advices and recommendations. Services from
the legal professions, such as the ones by doctors, financial experts, or art
consultants, can in fact be viewed as credence goods, in the sense of Darby and
Karni (1973): even after having used such services, due to the informational
asymmetry, clients cannot verify whether professionals acted in their interests.
This remains without consequence as long as lawyers act as perfect agents
for the clients, choosing what the clients would have chosen if they had
possessed all of the necessary legal knowledge. It does become a problem,
however, as long as the lawyers’ decisions on behalf of the clients are influenced
by their own interests. Lawyers, in fact, are not merely agents but also providers
and sellers of legal services. Italian lawyers are not an exception. Indeed, the
interests of lawyers and clients are potentially conflicting in two aspects.
First, following an increase in the number of lawyers, such as the one
observed for Italy in the 2000–2007 period, lawyers face the threat of a strong
competitive pressure in terms of fewer clients in their portfolio. Lawyers, however,
may envisage a goal of securing their own full employment or to maintaining their
previous, higher, income level. This would be consistent with the “target income
hypothesis” by Evans (1974), originally applied to physicians, by which profes-
sionals have a desired level of income that they strive to achieve, or to restore,
whenever actual income falls below the target. In such a case, following an
increase in competitive pressure and a contraction in their clients portfolio,
lawyers may have been tempted to manipulate the information provided to their
clients in order to induce them to bring lawsuits before a court. This potential
source of conflict of interest is favored by the Italian legislation by which clients
cannot pay to lawyers’ fees that are contingent on the outcome of the litigation.
Second, once started on a case, lawyers have an interest in inducing the
client to request a large number of acts and legal services. In fact, potential
conflicts of interest are exacerbated by the fact that in Italy the payment scheme
designed by the national council of lawyers is not only proportional to the time
and effort spent in a case but also integrated by a plethora of fees and tariffs for
each legal act or service supplied. Fees for services and tariffs, in fact, have been
found to be known facilitating factors of demand-inducement behavior by the
literature in health economics.21
Therefore, these potential sources of conflict of interest make the agency
relationship between lawyers and their clients imperfect and provide lawyers
21 Van De Voorde et al. (2001) found some indirect evidence of SID in the context of the Belgian
national health system, characterized by an excessive supply of doctors and by a fee-for-service
system.
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with incentives to exploit their informational advantage in their own interest.
Due to asymmetry of information, increased competitive pressure, and the
implicit incentives represented by the many fees for services, the demand for
legal services by clients may thus be partly induced by the lawyers.
6.2 An analysis of the judicial system in Italy and other
countries
To the best of our knowledge, no empirical study has yet explicitly and rigor-
ously tested the SID hypothesis for the case of legal services in Italy. Marchesi
(2003) suggests that the higher litigation rate could have been caused by the
existence of long trials: in fact, long waiting times to obtain a sentence give
incentives to one of the parties to breach contract in an attempt to postpone due
payments. Marchesi (2003) also observes that at least three out of the five actors
involved in a trial may have incentives to delay the time to obtain a sentence,
namely the party that is in the wrong and the lawyers for both parties.
Some other studies have rather focused on the organization of the “supply”
of justice in Italy and have mostly pointed to the low productivity of judges as
the main factor responsible for long waiting times. Coviello et al. (2012, 2014), for
instance, analyze the organization of two sections that specialize in labor dis-
putes in the of courts of justice of Milan and Turin and observe that judicial
offices working “in series” – that is, opening a new file only when the previous
ones have reached a sentence – appear to be significantly associated with
shorter waiting times than offices working “in parallel”.
Although no other study has yet explicitly tested the SID hypothesis for legal
services, the literature in law and economics has provided some indirect
evidence of links between the number of lawyers and litigation rates. For
instance, Ginsburg and Hoetker (2006) consider the case of Japan in the 1990s
and investigate the determinants of the civil litigation rates using prefecture-
level data. While they mainly attribute the litigation rate to structural changes in
the Japanese economy related to the post-bubble slowdown in growth, and to
institutional reforms, they also found a positive and significant (although small
in size) effect due to an increase in the number of lawyers per capita. In the
case of Italy, parallel to our work, other independent analyses have pro-
vided some evidence on the links between the number of lawyers and access
to justice.22 For example, Carmignani and Giacomelli (2010) investigated the
22 A previous version of the present paper discusses in more detail the Italian institutional
setting (Buonanno et al. 2009; Buonanno and Galizzi 2009).
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relationship between the number of lawyers and a single measure of litigation in
Italy over the period 2000–2005, finding evidence of a large and positive effect
of the number of lawyers on litigation. In their analysis, however, they are not
able to take into account unobserved heterogeneity since they rely on random
effect estimates. In a recent paper, Sobbrio et al. (2010) examine the relationship
between legal disputes and lawyers, under the assumption that the market is
characterized by the presence of asymmetric information between clients and
lawyers about the chance of winning a dispute. Their random effect estimates do
find a positive and large effect of lawyer numbers on legal disputes.
6.3 The analysis of SID in health
The SID hypothesis was originally proposed and empirically tested in the litera-
ture on health economics. Health, in fact, is a context where the above discussed
asymmetry of information clearly plays a central role in the relationship between
the doctor and the patient. In particular, a number of studies by health econo-
mists interested in physicians’ incentives and payment schemes have explicitly
empirically tested the SID hypothesis. In general, several studies have provided
some evidence in support of the SID hypothesis. For instance, Fuchs (1978),
using cross-section data on US surgeons, found that an increase of 10% in
surgeon density led, ceteris paribus, to a 3% increase in the frequency of
surgery. Tussing (1983) used data from Irish general practitioners and found
that the number of visits and the likelihood that a visit was initiated by the
physician were significantly positively correlated with the number of physicians
per population. Adam (1983), Breyer (1984) and Breyer et al. (1986) analyzed
regional German data between 1977 and 1982 and, using multi-equation models
to simultaneously explain physician density and per capita expenditure on
medical services, found statistically significant elasticity of per capita expendi-
ture to physician density with an estimated 0.1–0.4 elasticity. Kraft et al. (1986),
using data from a medical practice in the Canton of Berne, Switzerland, found a
statistically significant, positive, correlation between expenditure per medical
case and physician density, and, after a Hausman test, concluded that the latter
should be considered exogenous. Grytten et al. (1990) supported the SID hypoth-
esis for the Norwegian market for dental services, where, in a context of fixed,
uniform fees, both the demand and the expenditure for dental services increased
as the population/dentist ratio decreased. Grytten et al. (1995), using Norwegian
data, found some evidence of SID for diagnostic laboratory tests requested by
doctors. Gruber and Owings (1996) analyzed data from the US National Hospital
Discharge Survey in the 1970–1982 period (on 200,000 discharges from 400
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hospitals) and found evidence in favor of the SID hypothesis in the number of
Caesarian deliveries (more lucrative, and requiring a lower workload) to US
obstetricians than natural childbirth deliveries. Van De Voorde et al. (2001), by
estimating the effect of an increase in co-payment rates on patients’ out-of-
pocket price elasticity, indirectly found some evidence of inducement by general
practitioners in Belgium, characterized by an excessive supply of doctors and by
a physician remuneration scheme based on fees for services.23
The findings of the health economics literature are not unanimous, though.
A number of papers that tested the SID hypothesis did not find strong evidence
in support of it. Rossiter and Wilensky (1984), for instance, found little support
for the SID hypothesis from the data on expenditure for health services by a
representative sample of US population contained in the National Medical Data
Expenditure Survey. Grytten et al. (1995) used survey data on physician–patient
contacts for a representative sample of the Norwegian population and did not
find any sign of SID on the number of physician-initiated visits, although they
found some evidence of it in the number of diagnostic laboratory tests required
by physicians. Madden et al. (2005) studied the effect of a change in the
reimbursement system for Irish general practitioners on the utilization of their
services and found ambiguous evidence on SID.
6.4 SID in the presence of minimum fees: a graphical
framework
The literature in health economics typically analyses the SID hypothesis within
a simplified supply-demand graphical analysis, which serves as the main
conceptual framework. In this subsection, we discuss how this simple graphical
representation of the SID can be readily modified to account for the presence
of minimum fees, so to analyze the specific case of the Italian market for
legal services. Imagine that clients’ demand for legal services (L) negatively
depends on the level of lawyers’ charged fees (F). For the sake of simplicity,
suppose the initial demand function is linear in fees and can be represented as
D0(Figure 2).
Denote F as the minimum fee for service set by the national council of
lawyers. As discussed above, this level is uniform across all districts of justice
and legally binding for all Italian lawyers, in the sense that no lawyer in Italy
23 The validity of the empirical results by Van De Voorde et al. (2001) was questioned by Cockx
and Brasseur (2003), who argued that the authors’ estimated price elasticity ignored the
substitution effects induced by the change in relative prices of physician services.
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can charge less than F for providing legal services, while remaining free, at least
to some extent, to charge fees higher than F. The supply function of legal
services by Italian lawyers can therefore be expressed as a schedule of the
following type:
– for any F < F, L ¼ 0;
– for F ¼ F, L is any value within ½0; L0;
– for any F > F, L ¼ L0 þ αF;
with α >0, and where L0 stands for the proportion of lawyers in the market that
agree to supply legal services for a fee equal to the minimum fee set by the
national council.
The number L0 of lawyers working for the minimum fee can be thought of as
a function of some underlying characteristics of the organization of the legal
professions in Italy. For instance, one can think of L0 as the share of young
lawyers in the market. In fact, professionals that have just gone through the long
selection process, and have recently qualified to work as lawyers, can typically
act as aggressive entrants in the market and, in order to gain experience and
build a client portfolio, may therefore accept working for fees equal to the
minimum set by the national council. Despite a lack of data on the fees charged
for legal services at an individual level, the official statistics from Cassa
Nazionale Forense provide strong support for the argument that young lawyers
tend to charge prices close to the minimum fees. In fact, the national agency
managing the lawyers’ professional pension scheme has published the statistics
on the total income earned by these professionals, divided by professional
experience and age. As noticed from Table 10, the average yearly income for
young lawyers is significantly lower than the earnings of senior professionals. In
L
F
F
S0
D0
L0
F*0
L*0
Figure 2: Supply and demand functions with a minimum fee
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particular, lawyers aged between 24 and 39, representing 44% of active lawyers,
earn considerably less than lawyers’ average income.24 For instance, a newly
entered lawyer earns less than a fourth of average income and less than a ninth
of the income of well-established professionals.
Alternatively, one can think of L0 as reflecting the existing competitive pressure
in the provision of legal services from suppliers other than lawyers. In Italy for
instance, workers and consumers can access trade unions and consumers’ associa-
tions, respectively, in order to get legal assistance for small claims. On the other hand,
while large companies typically have internal legal officesdealingwithmost standard
issues, small and medium enterprises are also able to access other categories of
consultants (such as tax advisors, experts in labor andpension issues, amongothers),
or even consulting services organized and provided by local chambers of commerce
and branches of the business associations of which they are member.25
The supply schedule for legal services can thus be represented as a kinked,
piecewise linear, upward-sloping function with the shape represented by S0 in
Figure 2. In fact, for any fee lower than F, no legal service is provided. For fees
exactly equal to the level of the minimum fee, there is a proportion L0 of the
young professionals that will agree to supply legal services. The S0 function
represented in Figure 2 then assumes the remaining share of lawyers offers an
amount of legal services which is directly (and linearly) increasing with the
charged fees, as in a standard upward-sloping supply function.
Table 10: Yearly lawyers’ earnings (in euros) by age and experience
Age group 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 Experience (in years)
24–29 13,049 12,233 11,999 10,560 10,764 2
30–34 21,207 19,738 19,133 19,035 18,892 3.9
35–39 33,449 31,899 31,563 31,558 33,935 6.9
40–44 50,318 49,208 48,635 47,836 45,333 10.3
45–49 70,203 65,727 64,211 63,923 58,114 14.9
50–54 82,641 80,745 79,004 74,253 70,394 19.8
55–59 100,334 99,766 95,985 95,709 88,527 24.5
60–64 107,460 104,734 102,398 101,697 94,898 29.5
Total 51,314 49,213 47,387 46,860 44,817
Note: This table reports average annual earning of lawyers by age group for 2003–2007.
Experience (in years) refers to 2005. Data are published each year on La Previdenza Forense,
the official journal of the professional scheme agency (Cassa Nazionale Forense).
24 Young lawyers have on average less than 7 years of experience.
25 Such as Confindustria, the Italian equivalent of the Confederation of Business Industry in the
United Kingdom or the Chamber of Commerce in the United States.
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As usual, the intersection between demand and supply function provides the
equilibrium level of legal services and fees in the market. In our case, these
crucially depend on the initial relative position of D0 and L0. In fact, when the
share L0 of young lawyers is relatively low compared to the demand schedule,
intersection typically occurs in correspondence of the upward-sloping piece of S0,
and the equilibrium market fee is higher than the minimum legal fee, F0 > F, as in
Figure 2. On the other hand, when there are relatively many lawyers in the market
that agree to work for the minimum fees, equilibrium fees in the market coincide
with the minimum level set by the national council, F0 ¼ F, as in Figure 3. This
case can better fit the current situation in Italy where, as already discussed, in the
period 2000–2007 more than 50,000 young lawyers entered the market.
Clearly, the effects of an increase in the number of active lawyers in the Italian
market, and the likelihood of eventually supporting the SID hypothesis, ulti-
mately depend on the initial market equilibrium. In fact, imagine that, follow-
ing, for instance, the entry of a flow of young professionals, an increase occurs
in the level of active lawyers in the market. This can be represented by an
outward shift of the supply function from S0 to S1: in particular, as more
young lawyers enter the market, the number of lawyers that agree to work for
the minimum fees also shifts outwards, from L0 to L1.
The SID hypothesis assumes that, following the entry of new professionals
and the shift in the supply function, lawyers in the market would be tempted to
exploit their asymmetric advantage in order to induce their clients to demand
unnecessary or ineffective legal services. The increase in supply would thus also
induce an increase in demand, possibly to a lesser extent: this is consistent with
our empirical estimates, which found that a 10% increase in the number of
lawyers is associated with a 1.6–6% increase in the demand for legal services.
L
F
F
S0
D0
L0L
*
0
Figure 3: Equilibrium market price equal to the minimum fee
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Graphically, the demand schedule would also shift outwards, from D0 to D1. These
shifts would imply that, in the new market equilibrium, clients would buy a larger
quantity of legal services from lawyers. Therefore, under the SID hypothesis, an
increase in the number of lawyers in the market would be typically associated
with a greater access to courts of justice and to a higher litigation rate.
However, to find a full support for the SID hypothesis, the increase in the
litigation rate should be exclusively due to the artificially inflated demand
induced by lawyers. In particular, to fully accept the SID hypothesis, one should
also rule out the possibility that the higher litigation rate derives from a demand
that physiologically increases because of a drop in the fees. Therefore, the SID
hypothesis is compatible only within some specific initial market equilibrium. In
particular, imagine that the initial share of lawyers working for the minimum fees
L0 is relatively low, and that the initial intersection with demand occurs at a point
in the upward-sloping piece of the supply function. As in Figure 4, in the initial
market equilibrium an amount L0 of legal services is bought at an equilibrium fee
F0, higher than the minimum fees. In such a case, the induced demand by lawyers
following the entry of new professionals may not be the only explanation for an
observed higher litigation rate. In fact, following a shift from S0 to S1 due to a
higher number of lawyers active in the market, and a partially induced outwards
shift in demand, the new market equilibrium implies a higher number of traded
legal services L1 > L

0, but also a lower equilibrium fee F

1 < F

0. Therefore, even in
the presence of some inflated demand induced by lawyers, one cannot unambigu-
ously rule out the possibility that, to some extent, clients have indeed demanded
more legal services because fees have been reduced by increased competition.
This, in fact, would also be compatible with standard market adjustment.
On the other hand, imagine there are relatively many lawyers in the market
that agree to work for the minimum fees. This is very likely to be the case in
S0 S1
LL0 L
*
0 L
*
1
F*0
F*1
F
F D0 D1
Figure 4: Increase in supply and market adjustment
Testing the Excess of Litigation in the Italian Courts of Justice 317
Brought to you by | London School of Economics and Political Science
Authenticated
Download Date | 3/9/15 12:32 PM
Italy, where, as discussed above, as many as 50,000 young professionals have
recently entered the market, each earning an average income that is nine times
lower than the income of senior professionals. In such a case, the intersection
with demand occurs at a point in the horizontal segment of the supply function,
and equilibrium fees in the market will coincide with the minimum level set by
the national council. In such a case, the SID hypothesis may be fully supported
as an explanation for an observed higher rate of access to courts. In fact,
following the entry of more lawyers in the market, lawyers can, through their
advice to clients, artificially inflate the demand for their services to match the
higher supply, shifting demand outwards from D0 and D1. This leads to a new
market equilibrium, such as the one illustrated in Figure 5, in which a larger
amount of legal services is bought, L1 > L

0, even in the presence of unaffected
fees for services, that remain fixed at the level of the minimum fees F.
Therefore, the graphical framework typically used by the health economics
literature to illustrate the SID hypothesis can be readily modified to fully
account for the presence of minimum fees for services, such as the ones in
force in Italy for lawyers’ professional services.
7 Conclusions
In the present paper, we have tested the SID hypothesis for the case of legal services
in Italy and explored whether access to courts may be driven by the relative number
of lawyers operating in the provincial courts of justice. We have collected data from
different official sources and built an original dataset on the 169 Italian courts of
S0 S1
LL0L
*
0 L*1
F*0 = F
*
1 = 
F
F
D0
D1
Figure 5: Increase in supply and induced demand
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justice, considered over the period 2000–2007. Using panel data estimation techni-
ques, we have investigated the relationship between local litigation rates and the
number of lawyers officially active in the courts. We have controlled, among others
variables, for the number of magistrates in the court, major economic and socio-
demographic characteristics of population, levels of education and social capital in
the province. We have addressed the endogeneity issue by constructing two original
sets of instrumental variables: the first uses the 8-year lagged average proximity of
the province to the three closest law schools; while the second is the province
proximity to a law faculty founded in the Middle Ages.
Our main result is that the number of lawyers operating in a court does exert
a positive and statistically significant effect on the litigation rate. A 10% increase
in the number of lawyers over population is associated with a 3–6% increase in
litigation rates. This effect is robust across several specifications and checks,
both on the control variables and on the instruments.
Our results thus support the SID hypothesis for the Italian lawyers. The
evidence we provide is in line with the widespread opinion among experts,
regulators and policy-makers that the privilege of the Italian National Council of
Lawyers to set up mandatory minimum fees for legal services – which are binding
for all professionals – may have seriously hampered the functioning of a compe-
titive market for legal services in Italy. The existence of such a “price floor” for
professional fees may have particularly harmed young professionals at the begin-
ning of their career. Since, in the last decade, the market for legal services has
witnessed an unprecedented massive inflow of more than 50,000 young profes-
sionals, the binding minimum fees are likely to have artificially sustained the
prices of legal services at higher levels than would have otherwise occurred in
the absence of such a restriction. The increased competitive pressure on the legal
professionals may have been conveyed by alternative non-price channels. One
possibility is that lawyers may have been more tempted to opportunistically exploit
to their own advantage the asymmetry of information toward their clients and may
have induced them to bring lawsuit more often than would have been optimal in
the exclusive interest of their clients. Our evidence thus seems to provide direct
support for some of the recent reforms by the Monti government in Italy, aimed at
fostering competition in the market for legal services through the removal of
market barriers and restrictions. It is probably not by chance that one of the
envisaged reforms where the debate has been most heated is precisely the with-
drawal of the privilege to the National Council of Lawyers to set up minimum fees.
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Appendix
Table 11: Variable descriptions and data sources
Variables Description Source
Civil courts First-instance ordinary civil proceedings in front
of civil courts of justice per 1,000 inhabitants
Ministero della
Giustizia
Judges of peace First-instance ordinary civil proceedings in front
of honorary judges of peace per 1,000 inhabitants
Ministero della
Giustizia
Compensation Litigation for civil compensation claim per 1,000
inhabitants
Ministero della
Giustizia
Lawyers Number of lawyers per 1,000 inhabitants Cassa Forense
Judges Numbers of judges per 1,000 inhabitants Ministero della
Giustizia
Length Length of first-instance trials in days Ministero della
Giustizia
High school Percentage of population with high school diploma ISTAT
Associations Number of recreational, cultural, artistic and
sporting non-profit associations, each 100,000
inhabitants
ISTAT
Concentration Ratio between the population living in the provincial
administrative city over the population in the rest of
the provincial area
Authors’
calculation on
ISTAT data
GDP Real GDP per capita ISTAT and Istituto
Tagliacarne
Employment rate Employment rate ISTAT
Density Population density (km2) ISTAT
Note: All variables are available at the provincial level and for each year over the period 2000–2007.
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